**The interest convergence framework is offense against their movements claims at all levels of analysis—the Black Panthers proves.**

**Delgado ’02.** Richard Delgado, professor of law at the University of Colorado-Boulder, “Explaining the Rise and Fall of African American Fortunes: Interest Convergence and Civil Rights Gains,” Review of Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy, Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, Volume 37 [37 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 369], pp. 369-387 at 381-2

The Black Panther Party was a self-help, nationalist organization that began in Oakland, California, where it sponsored breakfast programs for black children and taught self-sufficiency, discipline, and black pride. n106 The Party also preached self-defense and the right of the black community to arm itself against aggressors such as the white police. n107 In the charged atmosphere that prevailed in 1967 and 1968, both aspects of the Black Panthers--the teaching of black pride and the right of forceful self-defense--were red flags to the establishment, particularly FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover. n108 When some of the organization's leaders began reading and teaching Malcolm X, Frantz Fanon, Marx, Mao, and Lenin, n109 this confirmed the government's belief that the Party had to be stopped. The organization also refused to be grateful for Brown *v. Board of Education* and federal civil rights legislation, further compounding the government's sense of affront. For the Panthers, the U.S. legal system was part of a national policy of black oppression, and what more moderate African Americans saw as breakthroughs, the Panthers and Malcolm X saw as cosmetic, token advances. n110 Moreover, the Panthers, like other militant organizations that sprang up during this time, were impatient with the prayerful, nonviolent strategy of Martin Luther King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. n111The Panthers, in short, were radically out of step with the designs of America's elites. They were ungrateful; they rejected Americanism and refused to fight in foreign wars; and, to make matters worse, they appeared poised to become respected models for other civil rights and nationalist community groups. n112 When government figures and major newspaper editors expressed consternation, J. Edgar Hoover's FBI was more than ready to take up a covert campaign against the Panthers. Hoover himself was a middle-class Virginian who espoused a genteel form of white supremacy. n113 Predisposed to distrust civil rights leaders and movements, he ordered his organization to keep an eye on Martin Luther [\*382] King, heavyweight boxing champion Jack Johnson, Marcus Garvey, Elija Muhammed, Stokely Carmichael, the Chicano Brown Berets, Puerto Rican nationalists, the Nation of Islam, and a host of other figures and organizations of color. n114 He even spoke disparagingly of activists who campaigned against lynching. Their "retaliatory measures in connection with [that practice]" represented a challenge to "the established rule of law and order." n115Anxious to reduce the Party's influence with the black community and other civil rights organizations, the government launched an intense campaign to discredit the group and neutralize its leaders. In 1969 alone, of 295 counterintelligence operations undertaken by the FBI, sometimes in coordination with local police, 233 were aimed at the Panthers. n116 The government's campaign included a media offensive designed to persuade the American public that the Panthers were dangerous, n117 as well as attempts to disrupt Black Panther social programs, like the breakfast program for school-age youth. n118 Government agents infiltrated the Panthers and other organizations such as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, (SNCC), and smeared those individuals who openly spoke in favor of the Party. n119 But most effective were the many pretextual raids and arrests of Party officials and the malicious prosecution of Panther leaders and activists throughout the country. n120 These attacks put the Party on the defensive, forced it to spend time, energy, and money on legal defense, distracted it from its social mission, and enabled the media to depict it as an organization of criminals. At least two Panther leaders--Fred Hampton and Mark Clark--were killed in a Chicago police raid. Civil rights leaders charged that they were murdered while in their beds. n121

**There is another type of interest convergence too—the ballot is a moment of interest convergence between them and the judge. The guilty solidarity of the 1AC masks the privilege that prevents their project from directly changing the lives of the people they invoke to warrant a ballot.**

**Chow ‘93.** Rey Chow, Andrew W. Mellon professor of the humanities at Brow, Rey, Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, p. 16-17

Why are "tactics" useful at this moment? As discussions about "multiculturalism,' "interdisciplinarity," "the third world intellectual," and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return to haunt us. Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the "otherness” ensuing from them; unattested claims of oppression and victimization that are used merely to guilt-trip and to control; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness—all these forces create new "solidarities" whose ideological premises remain unquestioned. These new solidarities arc often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are battles of words. Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are most certainly not directly changing the downtrodden lives of those who seek their survival in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan spaces alike. What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their "victimization" by society at large (or their victimization-in-solidarity-with-the-oppressed), but the power, wealth, and privilege that ironically accumulate from their "oppositional" viewpoint, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words. (When Foucault said intellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) The predicament we face in the West, where intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, is that "if a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business, ... he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen."28 Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising? How do we resist the turning-into-propriety of oppositional discourses, when the intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper? How do we prevent what begin as tactics—that which is "without any base where it could stockpile its winnings" (de Certeau, p. 37)—from turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense?

**If you vote aff, the ballot functions as a politics of self-subalternization. The judge is encouraged to found a vacuous solidarity with the Other by valorizing the material deprivation portrayed in their speeches. This strategy amounts to nothing more than a sham renunciation authorized by the same structures of power that produce alterity in the first place, turning the case at a higher level of analysis.**

**Chow ’93.** Rey Chow, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities at Brown, Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, p. 10-11

The Orientalist has a special sibling whom I will, in order to highlight her significance as a kind of representational agency, call the Maoist. Arif Dirlik, who has written extensively on the history of political movements in twentieth-century China, sums up the interpretation of Mao Zedong commonly found in Western Marxist analyses in terms of a "Third Worldist fantasy"—"a fantasy of Mao as a Chinese reincarnation of Marx who fulfilled the Marxist premise that had been betrayed in the West."16 The Maoist was the phoenix which arose from the ashes of the great disillusionment with Western culture in the 1960s and which found hope in the Chinese Communist Revolution.17 In the 1970s, when it became possible for Westerners to visit China as guided and pampered guests of the Beijing establishment, Maoists came back with reports of Chinese society's absolute, positive difference from Western society and of the Cultural Revolution as "the most important and innovative example of Mao's concern with the pursuit of egalitarian, populist, and communitarian ideals in the course of economic modernization" (Harding, p. 939). At that time, even poverty in China was regarded as "spiritually ennobling, since it meant that [the] Chinese were not possessed by the wasteful and acquisitive consumerism of the United States" (Harding, p. 941). Although the excessive admiration of the 1970s has since been replaced by an oftentimes equally excessive denigration of China, the Maoist is very much alive among us, and her significance goes far beyond the China and East Asian fields. Typically, the Maoist is a cultural critic who lives in a capitalist society hut who is fed up with capitalism—a cultural critic, in other words, who wants a social order opposed to the one that is supporting her own undertaking. The Maoist is thus a supreme example of the way desire works: What she wants is always located in the other, resulting in an identification with and valorization of that which she is not/does not have. Since what is valorized is often the other's deprivation—"having" poverty or "having" nothing—the Maoist's strategy becomes in the main a rhetorical renunciation of the material power that enables her rhetoric.

**Their identity politics collapse the real material differences between the positioning of the judge and the oppressed individuals for whom resistance constitutes survival. Deployment of victimization is a technique for spotlighting their righteousness at the cost of robbing the terms of protest of the complex oppositionality critical to rightful demands.**

**Chow ’93.** Rey Chow, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities at Brown, Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, p. 12-13

In the "cultural studies" of the American academy in the 1990s, the Maoist is reproducing with prowess. We see this in the way terms such as "oppression," "victimization," and "subalternity" are now being used. Contrary to Orientalist disdain for contemporary native cultures of the non-West, the Maoist turns precisely the "disdained" other into the object of his/her study and, in some cases, identification. In a mixture of admiration and moralism, the Maoist sometimes turns all people from non-Western cultures into a generalized "subaltern" that is then used to flog an equally generalized "West."21 Because the representation of "the other" as such ignores (1) the class and intellectual hierarchies within these other cultures, which are usually as elaborate as those in the West, and (2) the discursive power relations structuring the Maoist's mode of inquiry and valorization, it produces a way of talking in which notions of lack, subalternity, victimization, and so forth are drawn upon indiscriminately, often with the intention of spotlighting the speaker's own sense of alterity and political righteousness. A comfortably wealthy white American intellectual I know claimed that he was a "third world intellectual, citing as one of his credentials his marriage to a Western European woman of part-Jewish heritage; a professor of English complained about being "victimized" by the structured time at an Ivy League institution, meaning that she needed to be on time for classes; a graduate student of upper-class background from one of the world's poorest countries told his American friends that he was of poor peasant stock in order to authenticate his identity as a radical "third world" representative; male and female academics across the U.S. frequently say they were "raped" when they report experiences of professional frustration and conflict. Whether sincere or delusional, such cases of self-dramatizaton all take the route of self-subalternization, which has increasingly become the assured means to authority and power. What these intellectuals are doing is robbing the terms of oppression of their critical and oppositional import, and thus depriving the oppressed of even the vocabulary of protest and rightful demand. The oppressed, whose voices we seldom hear, are robbed twice—the first time of their economic chances, the second time of their language, which is now no longer distinguishable from those of us who have had our consciousnesses “raised.”